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RESPONSE 
 
WHAT IS LOCALIST JUDGING 
AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
PAUL A. DILLER† 
In response to Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 897 (2013). 
 
Judges are local officials too, Ethan Leib helpfully reminds us in his 
thought-provoking Article, Localist Statutory Interpretation.1 Like state court 
judges in our federal system, local judges—a category defined by Leib to 
include only elected jurists2—may play a special role in interpreting both 
state and local law. Ultimately, Leib concludes that this role is a highly 
constrained one. He is comfortable endorsing local judges’ reliance on local 
values (though only “in a narrow band of hard cases”)3 in large part because 
state courts and legislatures remain available to overrule decisions that 
unduly infringe on state interests.4 As an endorsement of “localism,” Leib’s 
is most tepid. 
But a tepid endorsement of localist judging is probably sufficient for even 
the most avid proponents of localism. After all, it is the process of local 
government itself—e.g., attending city council meetings, running for office—
that matters most to communitarians, and, except for the occasional decision 
about local government procedure, it is likely that judges can do little to affect 
this process positively or negatively. While some communitarians focus on 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. I thank Jennifer Evert 
for reviewing a draft of this Response. 
1 Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (2013). 
2 See id. at 903-04 (listing the common characteristics of “local courts”). 
3 Id. at 929. 
4 Id. at 927-28. 
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local juries as a key institution for educating and involving citizens,5 Leib’s 
definition of local courts excludes lower trial courts of general jurisdiction,6 
and thereby largely excludes courts with juries from his prescriptions. 
 For advocates of local government who extol its innovative power, a 
tepid endorsement of localist judging is probably also fine. Key policy 
innovations are likely to come from either political actors (the city council 
and mayor) or their delegates (local administrative agencies).7 To the extent 
that local judges might “innovate” within the context of statutes or ordi-
nances, their interpretive room is likely to be fairly narrow. Local judges 
might find more interpretive room within the common law, but Leib 
devotes scant ink to that possibility.8 Regardless, even an innovative 
common-law decision by a local judge can easily be reversed by a higher-
level state judge, provided that an appeal is taken. When there is no appeal, 
which is more common in cases that receive little attention, it is hard to see 
how a local judge’s decision matters much beyond the case in question. Of 
course, a litigant’s life might be greatly affected, which is no small thing, but 
one would expect there to be little interpretive diffusion.9 
Assuming, however, that local judges can find some interpretive room 
within which to import local concerns, serious questions remain about the 
prospect of localist judging. First, how much substantive difference can we 
expect to see between a local judge’s viewpoint and that of a state judge? 
Little, Leib’s examples suggest. He cites a municipal court judge in Lorain, 
Ohio, who takes “employability” issues into account when sentencing 
 
5 Alexis de Tocqueville, a prominent forerunner of communitarian thought, extolled the 
American jury as a “free school” that educates citizens on the law and self-governance in a 
democracy. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252-53 (J.P. Mayer & 
Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1848) (“I do not know whether a 
jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case. I 
regard it as one of the most effective means of popular education at society’s disposal.”). For a 
more recent incarnation of this view, see, for example, Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as 
Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 345-50 (2003), which argues that “[t]he American jury is 
the quintessential deliberative democratic body.” 
6 Leib, supra note 1, at 903; see also Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1157 n.247 (2012) (noting that municipal courts generally do not use juries). 
7 See generally Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and 
Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7-25), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2240416 (providing examples of innovative public health regulation by 
large municipalities). 
8 See Leib, supra note 1, at 930 (noting that the focus of his Article is statutory interpretation 
by local courts, not local court cases involving the common law). 
9 As Leib notes, most local court decisions are not published. Id. at 899-900. It is hard for an 
innovative legal interpretation to catch on when other judges, lawyers, and scholars cannot easily 
access it. Id. 
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criminal defendants.10 Are local employability concerns significantly 
different from statewide employability concerns? It is theoretically possible. 
One can imagine a state in which unemployment in a particular city is off 
the charts, far exceeding the statewide rate.11 In such a situation, the state’s 
primary goal may be ensuring public safety, while the city may be more 
concerned with reducing unemployment. But more common will be situa-
tions, like Ohio’s, where unemployment is presumably both a state and local 
concern. The unemployment rate in the City of Lorain hovers over Ohio’s 
statewide average by a percentage point or two.12 Does this difference really 
affect how a local judge performs his job? Should it? 
The likelihood that any difference between the substantive interests 
imported by “local judges” and those imported by “state judges” will be 
negligible is further illuminated by horizontal comparison. The judges of a 
state’s lowest-level courts of general jurisdiction are, according to Leib, 
“state judges,”13 but the vast majority of these judges are elected14 (and 
elected by an electorate that is a subset of the statewide voting pool). 
Should we expect much, if any, difference between the popular concerns 
that affect, say, a Lorain municipal court judge and those that influence his 
counterparts on the Ohio Court of Common Pleas (who sit less than nine 
miles away in Elyria)? The former is elected by the voters of Lorain city;15 
the latter are elected by the voters of Lorain County,16 which includes 
Lorain city.17 In other instances, the electoral overlap is more complete: the 
 
10 Id. at 908-09. 
11 See, e.g., Mike Wilkinson, Nearly Half of Detroit’s Workers Are Unemployed, DET. NEWS, 
Dec. ��, ����, at �A, ��A (noting that Detroit’s official and “unofficial” unemployment rates were 
27% and 44.8%, respectively, as compared to Michigan rates of 12.6% and 20.9%). 
12 Compare, e.g., Letter from Ronald L. Mantini, Auditor, City of Lorain, to Lorain City 
Council (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.cityoflorain.org/files/documents/files/�-21-11pkt_ 
1289.pdf (showing City of Lorain unemployment rates between January 2009 and December 2010 
based on statistics provided by the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services), with Ohio 
Unemployment Rate, Seasonally Adjusted, GOOGLE PUBLIC DATA, http://www.google.com/ 
publicdata/explore?ds=z1ebjpgk2654c1_ (follow “Unemployment rate” hyperlink; then follow 
“Ohio” hyperlink; then adjust graph timespan to January 2009—December 2010). 
13 See Leib, supra note 1, at 904 (classifying lower trial courts of general jurisdiction as part of 
the “state, rather than the local, political system”). 
14 See Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 16-17 
n.102 (2007) (noting that of the 8500 state trial court judges nationwide, only 24% are appointed). 
15 Court Officials, CITYOFLORAIN.ORG, http://www.cityoflorain.org/municipal_court/court_ 
officials (last visited June ��, ����). 
16 About the Court of Common Pleas, LORAIN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 
http://courtofcommonpleas.loraincounty.us (last updated June 3, 2013). 
17 The county’s population is roughly five times that of Lorain city. Compare State and County 
Quickfacts: Lorain County, Ohio, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
39/39093.html (last revised Mar. 11, 2013) (noting a population of 301,356 as of April 2010), with 
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exact same pool of voters elects both “local” judges and “state” trial court 
judges.18 While Leib hints that state court judges should serve state, rather 
than local, concerns,19 to the extent that lower-level state court judges’ views 
are affected by electoral pressure, expecting fealty to the state alone seems 
unrealistic. The electoral pressures that influence local judges, therefore, are 
likely quite similar to those that influence their state court counterparts, at 
least at the trial court level. 
A recent case illustrates this point: the legal challenge to New York 
City’s cap on the portion size of sugar-sweetened drinks, which is more 
popularly, and inaccurately, known as the “soda ban.”20 The plaintiffs—a 
consortium of business owners, a labor union, and industry associations—
alleged that the City’s Board of Health exceeded its delegated powers in 
promulgating a regulation that the Board lacked legal authority to adopt.21 
In raising their claims, the plaintiffs relied in part on the state constitution, 
but also invoked state and local law.22 The suit was filed in the Supreme 
Court of New York, New York County—the trial court of general jurisdic-
tion in Manhattan and, by Leib’s definition, a state court. Justice Milton 
Tingling invalidated the Board’s rule, largely agreeing with the plaintiffs’ 
claim that the Board had exceeded its delegated authority.23 Given that 
 
State and County Quickfacts: Lorain (City), Ohio, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/3944856.html (last revised Jan. 10, 2013) (noting a 
population of 64,097 as of the same date). 
18 This is particularly so where the borders of a county, the usual unit upon which state trial 
court divisions are based, are coextensive with those of a large city, as in the case of Philadelphia. See 
PA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (“There shall be one court of common pleas for each judicial district . . . .”); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 901(a) (West 2013) (declaring the first judicial district to consist of the 
“City and County of Philadelphia”); see also PA. CONST. art. V, § 6(c) (establishing a municipal court 
in Philadelphia).  
19 See Leib, supra note 1, at 925 (arguing that more fully integrating local judiciaries into the 
state judiciary reduces the likelihood of localist judging, presumably because “state” judges are 
more likely to serve state interests). 
20 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). 
21 Verified Article �� & Declaratory Judgment Petition at �, N.Y. Statewide Coal., No. 
653584/12 (Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Portion Cap Petition]. 
22 The prominent issues of local law in the portion-cap case are questions of charter, rather 
than ordinance, interpretation. See id. at 25-28 (arguing that the New York City Charter does not 
authorize the Board of Health to “engage in the unprecedented act of policy-making at issue 
here”). Presumably, Leib’s analysis would treat charter interpretation as similar to ordinance 
interpretation, although perhaps not, given that a charter, as a city’s foundational governing 
document, may be more analogous to a constitution than a statute. 
23 N.Y. Statewide Coal., No. 653584/12, slip op. at 35-36. On July 30, 2013, just prior to the 
publication of this Response, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed 
the trial court’s order. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
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Justice Tingling eventually faces an election before Manhattan voters,24 his 
decision may have been just as influenced by “local” concerns as any local 
court’s decision would have been. Even if lower-level state court elections, 
especially in New York City, are notoriously uncompetitive,25 it seems 
untenable to expect that they will function any differently from local court 
elections for the purpose of discerning local popular sentiment. And insofar 
as Justice Tingling credited local concerns in his decisionmaking,26 how 
much should they differ from state concerns? The state, presumably, has a 
similar interest in reducing obesity. Indeed, given the amount of money 
New York state spends on Medicaid as compared to New York City,27 the 
state might be said to have a greater interest than the city in combating 
obesity. Further, obesity rates are actually higher in New York state than in 
New York City.28 On the other hand, the city is moving more aggressively 
on many fronts to fight obesity. Does this mean that obesity prevention is 
more of a New York City value than a New York state value?  
Indeed, the litigation against New York City’s portion cap rule also 
illustrates the second major question raised by Leib’s invitation to local 
judges to heed local concerns: if elected judges depart from the “trustee” 
role, as envisioned by Leib,29 how should they discern the local concerns 
 
of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 3880139 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t July 
30, 2013). 
24 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6(c) (requiring justices of the supreme court to be chosen by 
the electors of their judicial district, and setting their terms at fourteen years). To be sure, New 
York Supreme Court justices’ fourteen-year terms are very long, even by judicial term standards. 
See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND 
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2013), available at http://www.judicialselection.com/ 
uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf (listing term lengths for judges 
of state general jurisdiction courts). 
25 See López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 198-200 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting the lack of competition in New York Supreme Court races), rev’d, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).  
26 Justice Tingling recognized the city’s interest in fighting obesity, but did not distinguish 
systematically the obesity-related harm to the city from that inflicted upon the state and nation as 
a whole. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., No. 653584/12, slip op. at 7-� (“The health of its residents affects 
the economics of a town, village, city, state and nation.”). 
27 See CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, A POOR WAY TO PAY FOR MEDICAID: WHY NEW 
YORK SHOULD ELIMINATE LOCAL FUNDING FOR MEDICAID 5 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/REPORT_Medicaid_��������.pdf (noting that for fiscal 
year 2012, New York’s counties—five of which constitute New York City—would pay 13% of the 
state’s total contribution to Medicaid, while the state government would fund the remainder). 
28 See Sewell Chan, Data Say Manhattan’s Slim; But the Bronx? A Bit Chubby, N.Y. TIMES, 
July ��, ����, at A�� (noting that Manhattan’s obesity rate was significantly below the state 
average, and that obesity rates in three of the other four New York City boroughs were just below 
the state average). 
29 See Leib, supra note 1, at 916-17 (explaining the “trustee” model of judging as one where 
judges “are independent of public opinion and remain unaffected by the people’s demands” 
 
14 Diller Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)8/1/2013 8:54 AM 
336 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 331 
 
that Leib thinks may appropriately inform their decisionmaking? The 
literature on the subject of elected judges acting as something other than 
trustees has generally focused on state courts and, more specifically, on 
judges using popular sentiment to interpret state constitutions.30 Leib 
recognizes that lower-level judicial elections are likely to be poor vehicles 
for discerning popular sentiment, given that they are notoriously uncompet-
itive affairs that attract little voter interest.31 Despite this fact, and although 
Leib disavows judges “tak[ing] opinion polls” to decide “difficult statutory 
cases,”32 he still endorses the notion that elections provide “meaningful 
input” into local judges’ decisionmaking.33 But Leib appears to be thinking 
mostly of cases in which local concerns stand in contrast to some potentially 
contradictory state goal. Yet local concerns themselves may be quite 
conflicting, as the New York City portion-cap case demonstrates.  
If Justice Tingling had looked to poll numbers to discern the relevant 
local concerns, he would have seen that most residents of New York City 
(even Manhattan) opposed the portion cap rule.34 If, however, he had 
looked to the views of local officials like Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who 
championed the rule, he would have heard very different concerns: the toll 
obesity exacts on city residents’ health, particularly in lower-income com-
munities and communities of color; the billions of dollars New York City 
spends on Medicaid and on public hospitals; and the fact that soda exacer-
bates obesity, which adds to this financial strain.35 If Justice Tingling had 
credited the views of certain city council members, he might have heard 
different local opinions, such as how the rule would hurt certain businesses.36 In 
 
(quoting Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Judicial Elections: An Attentive 
Public or an Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 36 tbl.4 (1984))). 
30 See, e.g., Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a 
State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1655, 1659-74 (2010) 
(assessing how “backlash risks and the capacity of state justices to assess in-state consequences” 
affect state constitutional decisions). 
31 Leib, supra note 1, at 913-15. 
32 Id. at 915.  
33 Id. at 917. 
34 Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Soda Ban, Calling It an 
Overreach by Bloomberg, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at A19. 
35 See Casey Neistat, Op-Docs, Soda Ban Explained, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/opinion/soda-ban-explained.html?ref=nyregion (describing the 
“soda ban” as a “small step toward a solution” to curbing obesity and its medical costs); see also 
CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, supra note 27, at 12, 13 tbl.2 (noting that New York City spent $4.6 
billion on Medicaid in fiscal year ����). 
36 See Portion Cap Petition, supra note 21, at 16-19 (citing objections to the rule from city 
council members, local businesses, and consumer advocates). In assessing whether the Board had 
exceeded its delegated powers, Justice Tingling briefly discussed the city council’s action—or, 
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other words, an answer to the epistemic question of which local concerns are 
relevant and may legitimately inform statutory (or ordinance, or charter) 
interpretation is far from clear.37 Leib has invited elected judges to enter this 
thicket, but he has not yet provided a clear way through the brush. 
That Leib’s analysis provokes as many questions as it answers proves 
that he has drawn attention to an area ripe for further exploration. By 
calling attention to localist judging, Leib has introduced broader questions 
about how and from whom judges ought to discern community values.38 
This is an issue that also plays out in the context of judicial elections at the 
state level, as well as in the context of deciding preemption cases, in which 
judges must determine whether a local ordinance conflicts with a statewide 
concern.39 In shifting the focus of intrastate power struggles to local courts, 
Leib has drawn our attention to a heretofore under-appreciated actor. 
Continued attention to local judges—and localist judging—can only enrich 
the broader debate about vertical distribution of power in state and local 
government law. 
 
 
Preferred Citation: Paul A. Diller, Response, What is Localist Judging and 
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pennlawreview.com/responses/8-2013/Diller.pdf. 
 
 
more aptly, inaction—with respect to regulating sugar-sweetened beverages. N.Y. Statewide Coal. 
of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 
653584/12, slip op. at 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013) (“The New York City Council and New 
York Legislature have continuously decided not to pass legislation targeting the consumption of 
sugar-sweetened beverages . . . .”). 
37 With respect to state judges, Leib has wrestled with this issue in some depth in prior 
work. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1237-�� (����) (discussing how methods of judicial selection influence judges’ 
approach to statutory interpretation). 
38 As noted earlier, supra note 5, there is a connection here to the literature that looks to local 
juries as fonts of community values. See Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial 
Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 408-14 (2009) (characterizing the right to a jury trial as a community 
right); Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1375-87 (2012) 
(arguing that juries “inject community norms into the legal system”). 
39 See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1140-57 (2007) (examining the 
intrastate preemption doctrine). 
